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Ruckleshaus '. Sierra Club. Muddying the Waters
of Fee-Shifting in Federal Environmental
Litigation
In numerous federal environmental statutes, Congress gave plaintiffs the
right to recover attorneys'fees when the court finds them "appropriate."
In Ruckleshaus v. Sierra ,Club, the United States Supreme Court held that
it was only "appropriate" to grant attorneys'fees when the plaintiff had at
least partially prevailed on the merits. The decision ignored both the im-
portant role environmental groups play in the interpretation and develop-
ment of regulatory programs through litigation and the ability of the lower
courts to determine when attorneys' fees were "appropriate." The Court,
instead, focused on the adversarial nature of such groups and the tradi-
tional American common law notions regarding attorneys' fees awards.
The effect of the decision is to hamper the efforts of environmental groups
by placing economic and psychological barriers in the path of any future
actions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, suits have proliferated against federal ad-
ministrative agencies by private citizens and public interest
groups wishing to vindicate various rights and interests.' One
major obstacle facing potential litigants has been the enormous
cost involved in pursuing a remedy through the administrative
and judicial mazes.2 Several theories of attorney fee-shifting have
1. "[T]he largest category of cases coming before the United States Supreme
Court [today] involves the review of administrative action, mainly reflecting the
enforcement of regulatory statutes, and that this category comprises about one-
third of all the cases coming before the Court." B. ScHwARTz, ADmSTRATrVE
LAw 23 (1982).
2. In an early case brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Newman v. Pig-
gie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), the Court was concerned that in spite of legis-
lation allowing private actions to enforce compliance with the Act, "few aggrieved
parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the in-
junctive powers of the federal courts" if they had to routinely pay their own attor-
neys' fees. Id. at 401-02. See also the remarks of Senator Strom Thurmond in
support of an attorney fee-shifting provision in the Freedom of Information Act
Amendments:
We must insure that the average citizen can take advantage of the law to
the same extent as the giant corporations with large legal staffs. Often the
average citizen has foregone the legal remedies supplied by the Act be-
cause he has had neither the financial nor legal resources to pursue litiga-
tion when his Administrative remedies have been exhausted.
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
been formulated to help alleviate this problem, and encourage cit-
izens to seek personal justice or to act as "watch dogs" over gov-
ernment regulations.3 One approach utilized in the federal
system has been to include in some one hundred federal statutes
specific authorization awarding costs and attorneys' fees in citi-
zens' actions which promote statutory goals.4 Although these
statutory provisions contain different criteria to determine when
awards of costs and fees should be granted,5 most of the major
federal environmental statutes6 specify that attorneys' fees may
be granted to any party whenever the court deems it "appropri-
ate."7 The Clean Air Act contains two such provisions,8 the inter-
pretation of which is the basis for the controversy in a recent
United States Supreme Court case, Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club. 9
The Court held in Ruckleshaus that the provision in section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act, which authorizes attorneys' fees to be
awarded where the court finds them "appropriate", did not au-
thorize the granting of such fees to unsuccessful plaintiffs.' 0 In a
decision based almost entirely on interpretation of scant and frag-
3. For a general discussion of the history and purposes of attorney fee-shift-
ing, see Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 281 (1977); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Lit-
igation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975).
4. Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants,
96 HARv. L. REV. 677, 680 (1983) (discussing federal statutory authorization for fee-
shifting) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants].
5. See E. RicHARD LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATrORNEY'S FEES 323-
27 (1981) (listing the various types of statutory provisions) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON].
6. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, § ll(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1982); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp.
IV 1980); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c)
(Supp. IV 1980); Clean Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Marine Pro-
tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1976); Deepwater
Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d), 42
U.S.C. §300j-8(d) (1976); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12d, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d)
(1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 335(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1976);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 700(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)
(Supp. IV 1980); Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f)
(Supp. IV 1980); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d)
(Supp. IV 1980); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 3114(d), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9124(d) (Supp. IV 1980); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978, § 23(a)(5), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
7. See Note, Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, supra note 4, at 681 (use
of term "appropriate" in predominately environmental legislation indicates that
Congress intended something different than when it passed different types of pro-
visions in other statutes).
8. Section 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7064(d) (Supp. IV 1980); § 307(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
9. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
10. Id. at 3281.
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mented legislative history," the Court was sharply divided in a
five to four decision over the issue of what Congress intended by
the word "appropriate."12 The majority of the Court, in the ab-
sence of specific language to the contrary, refused to abandon his-
toric fee-shifting principles in favor of what it viewed as a radical
departure from traditional guidelines.13
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The "American Rule" regarding the recovery of legal fees has
been that, absent statutory or contractual provisions, each party
to a lawsuit must pay his or her own attorney's fees.' 4 Two ex-
ceptions to the rule have been fashioned in the federal courts pur-
suant to their equity powers: the common fund exception15 and
the bad faith exception.' 6
In the early 1970's the federal courts initiated a third exception
based on a "private attorney general" theory. 17 The rationale was
11. See Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 277, 331-32 (1982) (discussing lack of congressional guidance for courts in in-
terpreting legislative intent). It is suggested that a plausible explanation for Con-
gress' failure to provide direct guidance is the fact that most of the discretionary
fee-shifting provisions were enacted prior to Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), when lower courts awarded fees under the private
attorney general rationale. Id. at 332 n.251. If Congress had been aware of the im-
pact of Alyeska, it might have been able to provide the courts with more guidance.
While this may be true of many of the statutory fee-shifting provisions in other
acts, it is not true of the majority of environmental statutes, which were passed
after 1975. See supra note 6 (listing major environmental statutes containing the
"appropriate" standard). A logical inference is that Congress either did not fore-
see the problems broad language would create, or it simply did not wish to be
more explicit, thus preferring to leave interpretation to the courts.
12. The Court began its discussion with a dictionary definition of the word
"appropriate," which it ultimately discarded. It concluded that such a definition
has no relevant meaning when applied to the statute; rather, the word "appropri-
ate" must be defined by reference to established statutory and judicial fee-shifting
rules. 103 S. Ct. at 3276.
13. Id. at 3281. The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist. The
dissent was authored by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun.
14. 421 U.S. at 257. For a general discussion of the history and development of
the American Rule and fee-shifting exceptions, see 421 U.S. at 247-62; see also
Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at 278-86.
15. The common-fund doctrine originated in two Supreme Court decisions:
Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), and Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
16. The bad faith exception is set forth in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
17. The first use of this term apparently occured in Newman v. Piggie Park
that litigants who were successful in vindicating important poli-
cies which Congress considered to be of "the highest priority"18
were entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Federal courts inter-
preted the early decisions as granting courts authority to apply
principles of equity to award fees to litigants who had advanced
important public interests.19 However, the judicial expansion of
the doctrine was brought to a halt by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,20
which held that the determination of public policy and the award-
ing of fees are matters for congressional action.2 1 Absent express
statutory authorization, therefore, any judicial adoption of a pri-
vate attorney general rationale "would make major inroads on a
policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself."22
After the private attorney general theory was effectively invali-
dated, Congress responded by promulgating various statutes ex-
pressly authorizing fee-shifting in certain circumstances. 23 The
majority of these statutes authorized awards of attorneys' fees
specifically to "prevailing"24 or "substantially prevailing" 25 par-
ties. In most cases, however, the task of determining the scope of
these terms was left in the hands of the courts. 26
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (plaintiff who obtains an injunction under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private
attorney general' ").
18. Id.
19. The private attorney general theory was adopted by seven federal courts
of appeals. See Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, supra note
11, at 284-85 & n.25 (listing several federal cases wherein the doctrine was applied).
20. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
21. Id. at 262. Although it was struck down in the federal courts, the doctrine
has still found favor in some state courts. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25,
569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977) (court awarded two public interest law firms
more than $800,000 in attorneys' fees based on this theory).
22. 421 U.S. at 269.
23. Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at
286.
24. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 205(g)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1)
(1982); Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, § 24, 15
U.S.C. § 2073 (1982); Patent Infringement Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 285 (1976); Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
25. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, § 1(b) (2) (E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E)
(1982); Privacy Act, § 3(g) (2) (B), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2) (B) (1982); Antitrust Im-
provement Act of 1976, § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
26. For cases interpreting who is a "prevailing" party, see Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (parties who obtain their objectives through settlement are
"prevailing"); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 1980) ("estab-
lishment of a right or the proscription of a wrong" is the minimum requirement);
Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1979) (required
success on "central issue"); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.
1978) (plaintiffs are "prevailing" if they succeed on any significant issue in litiga-
tion which achieves some of the benefit they sought); Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (unsuccessful plaintiff is "prevail-
ing" if the suit is a catalyst which causes defendant to eliminate a discriminatory
[Vol. 11: 441, 1984] Federal Environmental Litigation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
In the environmental area, a significant number of statutes pro-
vide that "the court may award costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it
determines that such an award is appropriate. '27 Seeing this lan-
guage as a delegation of broad discretionary power, some federal
courts have interpreted the provision to mean that they are em-
powered to award attorneys' fees not only to prevailing or sub-
stantially prevailing parties, but also to nonprevailing parties. 28
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch2fl was a prime example; the circuit court's
decision to award attorneys' fees to the losing plaintiff in that
case formed the basis of the controversy in Ruckleshaus v. Sierra
Club.
III. *FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish standards for
the emission of sulfur dioxide by power plants.30 In 1979, the EPA
responded by promulgating a controversial standard for sulfur di-
oxide for all new plants.31 A number of parties, including the Si-
erra Club, filed petitions for review of the EPA's action;32
policy or procedure). A synopsis of these varying standards has been stated as
follows:
[A] plaintiff can be deemed to have prevailed not only through final judg-
ment but also through settlements and consent decrees, through volun-
tary compliance by defendants where the plaintiff's lawsuit can fairly be
viewed as having provided the catalyst for defendants' actions, and even
through post- and sometimes pre-lawsuit administrative proceedings.
LARSON, supra note 5, at 9-10.
For holdings on "substantially prevailing" parties, see, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hamp-
ton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (party must have prevailed on the merits of at least
some claim); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 352 (4th Cir. 1980)
(party must achieve victory on. merits of at least one claim).
27. See supra note 6 for a list of statutes containing the "appropriate"
provision.
28. See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982); Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d
802 (D.C. Cir. 1981); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 507 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1981),
rev'd sub nom. Village of Kak.ovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Citizens
Ass'n v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535
F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
29. 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) and 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(per curiam), rev'd sub nom. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
30. Clean Air Act, § 109(c) (1)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.8, 60.40).
32. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
however, the court of appeal rejected the petitions. 33 The Sierra
Club then sought an award of attorneys' fees incurred in the un-
derlying case. In Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 34 the court granted at-
torneys' fees to the Sierra Club, thus allowing such an award to
the non-prevailing parties under section 307(f) of the Clean Air
Act. While cases in which such an award would be appropriate
are few, the court found that this was just such a case.35 The
court postponed a final award in order to allow the Sierra Club
and the EPA to resume negotiations over a settlement of the
fees. 36 When a settlement was not forthcoming after several
months, the court made the final award of fees. 37
The EPA was then granted a writ of certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court.38 On July 1, 1983, the Supreme Court re-
versed the District of Columbia Circuit's decision, holding that
"absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimants, it
is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees
under section 307(f)."39
IV. ANALYSIS
The central issue in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club was defined as
"whether it is 'appropriate,' within the meaning of section 307(f)
of the Clean Air Act, to award attorney's fees" to a party that
failed to succeed on the merits of its claims.40 The Court consid-
ered this issue from four different perspectives: statutory lan-
guage; legislative history; comparison of section 307(f) with
section 304(d); and governmental waiver of immunity theory.
A. Statutory Language
The Court stated that its first objective was to determine the
meaning of "appropriate." A dictionary definition was given as
"specially suitable: fit, proper,"41 but the Court declared this defi-
nition to be useless as a guide to congressional intent. In order to
ascertain the appropriate legal meaning, the Court looked to other
sources.42
33. Id. at 410.
34. 672 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noma. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club,
103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
35. 672 F.2d at 39.
36. Id. at 42.
37. 684 F.2d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
38. 103 S. Ct. 254 (1982).
39. 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3281 (1983).
40. Id. at 3276.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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The Justices initially considered the Senate Report to section
307(f), which stated: "The purpose of the amendment . . . is to
carry out the intent of the committee in 1970 that a court may, in
its discretion, award costs of litigation to a party bringing a suit
under section 307 .... -"43 The Court treated this excerpt merely
as an example of the lack of guidance provided by Congress, and
failed to analyze it in terms of the meaning of "in its discretion,"
which might have provided a key to the actual congressional in-
tent." Indeed, the mention of this reference did not appear to
lend authority to the Court's position; rather, as the minority as-
serted, it tended to support the argument that Congress intended
to give the courts a broad power of discretion to decide what is
"appropriate."45
Without further discussion of the relationship between the
grant of discretion and the determination of appropriateness, the
Court moved on to discuss the history of fee-shifting in this coun-
try and the use of the terms '"prevailing" and "substantially pre-
vailing."46 Justice Rehnquist noted that the common thread
running through the relevant decisions was that a successful
party-need not pay for its unsuccessful adversary's fees, 47 a con-
cept based on "ordinary conceptions of just returns."48 In other
words, "a party who wrongfully charges someone with violations
of the law should [not] be able to force that defendant to pay the
costs of the wholly unsuccessful suit against it."49
From the choice of language used by the Court, the majority ap-
parently viewed public interest litigants as adversaries of the gov-
ernment. The decision ignored the role envisioned by Congress-
that of citizen participation in and contribution to the interpreta-
tion and development of regulatory programs as an aid to achiev-
43. Id. at n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99, reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1416) (emphasis in original).
44. This is just the first instance where the Court appears to have made a pre-
judgment about a key piece of legislative history, mentioning it almost in passing
and then moving on. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text and infra note
71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's treatment of Natural Re-
source Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 3286-87, n.15.
46. Id. at 3276-77.
47. Id. at 3277. The minority, however, refuted this contention, noting that the
government routinely pays for unsuccessful litigants' fees in criminal cases failing
under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(d) (1976). 103 S. Ct. at 3281-82.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3277.
49. Id.
ing statutory goals.50 By focusing on the adversarial rather than
the beneficial aspect of public interest litigation, the Court relied
on "intuitive notions of fairness" 51 instead of the idea that public
interest litigants have a right to challenge government actions-
and therefore a right to compensation for their contribution to
public policy formation.5 2
The dissent found fault with the majority's one-dimensional
description of the role played by the Sierra Club.53 The minority,
noting the complexity of the underlying case and the contribution
of the Sierra Club to a final decision, concluded that the organiza-
tion had performed a vital public benefit both in bringing the suit
and in the quality of its briefs.54 Although it is this basic disagree-
ment over the role of the public interest litigant which lies at the
heart of the controversy, the Court never openly discussed it, per-
haps fearing that to do so would leave it open to charges that this
was a "political" decision.
In concluding its discussion of the meaning of "appropriate,"
the Court stated that if Congress had intended a departure from
traditional fee-shifting schemes, it would have used explicit lan-
guage in section 307(f) to indicate such a change. 55 The Court
found that the term modified, but did not completely reject, the
traditional rule that a fee claimant must "prevail" before recover-
ing attorneys' fees. 56 In the Court's attempt to clarify the mean-
ing of "appropriate," however, it failed to define the scope of the
term "modify," which may ultimately give rise to further
litigation.
Additionally, the Court failed to squarely answer the points
raised by the minority that Congress explicity gave the courts the
power to use their discretion in interpreting what is appropriate 57
and that Congress had the opportunity to specify the amount of
success required of a party when it wrote section 307(f).58 Con-
50. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1416 (§ 307(f) of the Clean Air Act was intended to en-
courage public litigation that would assure balanced implementation and admin-
stration of the Act).
51. 103 S. Ct. at 3277.
52. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976).
53. 103 S. Ct. at 3282.
54. Id. at 3282-84.
55. Id. at 3277.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3289.
58. Id. at 3290. The minority cited several pieces of legislative history which
appear to support its contention that Congress expressly rejected statutory lan-
guage which included specific criteria of "prevailing" and "substantially prevail-
ing" parties and adopted instead the broader "appropriate" standard for § 307(f).
Id. at 3286 n.14. The majority stated that the reason Congress failed to adopt the
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gress' choice to use the "appropriate" standard may be evidence
that it did not intend to adopt the traditional standards.59 The
Court's holding thus provides specific standards which Congress
deliberately left out. Substituting its own judgment, based on
traditional fee-shifting notions, the Court concluded that it is not
appropriate to award attorneys' fees to losing parties.
B. Legislative History
The Court's consideration of the legislative history of section
307(f) began with the observation that the Sierra Club relied pri-
marily on an excerpt from the 1977 House Report discussing the
purpose of the new section. 60 Unfortunately, the Court dismissed
the report rather summarily, reading it only to expand the class of
parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially
prevailing parties.61 This conclusion was not based on an analysis
of the excerpt itself but, on a review of conflicting lower court defi-
nitions of "prevailing parties" 62 and the legislative history of sec-
tion 36 of Senate Bill 252, a forerunner of section 307(f).63 This
"prevailing" and "partially prevailing" standards was because the original lan-
guage "required" fee awards to prevailing parties, and this was simply too radical.
Id. at 3279 nn.7, 11. The majority's reasoning did not explain, however, why Con-
gress did not simply change "requires" to "permits" and leave the rest of the sec-
tion intact. Congress' rejection of the entire section, the adoption of a completely
different standard, seems to indicate the actual congressional intent.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3278. In pertinent part, the excerpt reads:
In the case of section 307 judicial review litigation, the purposes of the au-
thority to award fees are not only to discourage frivolous litigation, but
also to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and
administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest. The com-
mittee did not intend that the court's discretion to award fees under this
provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was
the "prevailing party." In fact, such an amendment was expressly re-
jected by the committee, largely on the grounds set forth in NRDC v. EPA,
484 F.2d 1331, 1388 [sic] (1st Cir. 1973) (emphasis added by court).
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1077, 1416.
61. 103 S. Ct. at 3279. At this point, the Court defined "partially prevailing par-
ties" as those achieving "some success, even if not major success." Id. (emphasis
in original).
62. Id. at 3278-80. The Court found significant the argument that some courts
have set more restrictive standards for prevailing and partially prevailing parties.
The Court reasoned, therefore, that Congress wanted to promulgate a single stan-
dard - "appropriate." This term, however, meant "prevailing" or "partially pre-
vailing." This circular logic does little to provide a reasonable explanation of
congressional intent.
63. Id. at 3279-80. The Court noted that since the Senate bill dealt separately
discussion, however, neglects the fact that the Senate committee
specifically adopted the grounds as set forth in National Resource
Defense Council, Inc. [NRDC] v. EPA [NRDC].64 The Court's
only mention of NRDC defines the standard based on the particu-
lar facts in NRDC. Since the petitioners in that case were par-
tially prevailing and were granted attorneys' fees, the Court
adopts these as the "grounds" referred to in the Senate commit-
tee report. Therefore, the majority used NRDC to support its con-
clusion that the excerpt did not give credence to the Sierra Club's
contentions. 65
The minority argued that the committee report excerpt indi-
cates an intent to adopt the reasoning, but not the facts, in
NRDC. 66 Although the report stated specifically that the commit-
tee rejected a prevailing party standard "on the grounds set forth
in NRDC v. EPA," the majority selectively referred only to the
fact that the plaintiffs were partially prevailing. The Court relied
on the NRDC court's statement that petitioners had been success-
ful in several major respects and "should not be penalized for
having advanced some points of lesser weight."67
The committee's reliance on the case indicated that it was de-
serving of more attention than that alloted by the majority. The
NRDC court had stated that the "appropriate" standard gives a
court the "liberty to consider not merely 'who won' but what ben-
efits were conferred." 68 The majority did not strengthen its posi-
tion by ignoring the earlier, lengthier discussion of the court's
rationale, especially since it was this holding which was adopted
by the court in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch.69 The Court's analysis of
this excerpt demonstrated that it may have intentionally side-
with prevailing ("shall recover") and partially prevailing ("may recover") parties,
Congress understood them to be distinct. By rejecting this specific language for
the "appropriate" standard, the Court understood Congress to be merely ex-
panding authorization for fees to be awarded to both prevailing and partially pre-
vailing parties "when appropriate."
64. 484 F.2d 1331 (lst Cir. 1973).
65. 103 S. Ct. at 3280.
66. Id. at 3288.
67. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d at 1338.
68. Id. The heart of the court's rationale is as fellows:
The purpose of an award of costs and fees is not mainly punitive. It is to
allocate the costs of litigation equitably, to encourage the achievement of
statutory goals. When the government is attempting to carry out a pro-
gram of such vast and unchartered dimensions, there are roles for both
the official agency and a private watchdog. The legislation is itself novel
and complex. Given the implementation dates, its early interpretation is
desirable. It is our impression, overall, that petitioners, in their watchdog
role, have performed a service.
484 F.2d at 1338.
69. 672 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983) ("It is clear. .
that whether Sierra Club ... [is) entitled to attorneys' fees turns not on whether
[Vol. 11: 441, 19841 Federal Environmental Litigation
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stepped the issue of congressional intent as embodied in the only
relevant legislative history available. 70
C. Comparison of section 307(f) with section 304(d)
Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act contains the same provision
as section 307(f); accordingly, the Court believed that the relation
between the two was "instructive."7 ' In section 304 actions, pri-
vate parties are the defendants. Therefore, if attorneys' fees are
to be granted to unsuccessful plaintiffs under the "appropriate"
standard, "the private defendant may well succeed in refuting
each charge against it ... [and yet] the defendant's reward could
be a second lawyer's bill . . . payable to those who wrongly ac-
cused it of violating the law."72 This statement, however, is quali-
fied by a note which states: "We do not mean to suggest that
private parties should be treated in exactly the same manner as
governmental entities. . .. ,"73 This note serves to diminish the
majority's argument and lends support to the minority's position
that the two sections cannot be compared in any meaningful
manner.
74
[it has] prevailed in whole or in part, but on whether [it has] served the goals of
the Clean Air Act.").
70. Discussion of this crucial committee report is given just 21 lines, 103 S. Ct.
at 3280, while 24 lines are given to a discussion of a staff report which the Court
felt supported their position. Id. The Court stated that section 307(f) was meant
to be narrower than its forerunner. Id. The committee report stated: 'The confer-
ence report [for § 307(f)] contained a narrower House provision. [Congress] au-
thorized but did not require, courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees to any
party against whom EPA acted unreasonably in initiating an enforcement ac-
tion." (emphasis added). STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ENviRONMENTAL POLLUI'ON
OF THE COMM. ON ENVrRONmENT AND PUBLIc WoRKS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SEC-
TION-BY-SECTION ANALYsis OF S. 252 AND S. 253, 37 (Comm. Print 1977). This refer-
ence is clearly inappropriate, since it does not pertain to the type of litigation
covered by section 307(f), which are challenges of the validity of standards
promulgated by the agency. Instead, the reference is to a situation where the EPA
has unreasonably brought enforcement action against an innocent party. As the
minority points out, 103 S. Ct. at 3287 n.16, this provision was later codified as part
of section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. V 1976).
71. 103 S. Ct. at 3280.
72. Id. at 3280-81.
73. Id. at 3281 n.12.
74. Id. at 3289 n.24. There is an important distinction between section 304
suits, which serve the fu nction of abatement of air pollution, and section 307 suits,
which are concerned With challenges to the validity of standards promulgated by
the EPA. A comparison of the two may be like comparing apples and oranges.
Section 304 suits can be compared to traditional litigation between private citi-
zens. Section 307 suits are brought by private citizens challenging the EPA's exer-
cise of its delegated power. Should a court grant fees to a losing plaintiff in a
The Court's hypothetical concern that, apart from its holding in
this case, innocent parties could be forced to pay for the attor-
neys' fees of their malicious persecutors is not supported by ac-
tual judicial experience.75 Additionally, the use of this argument
by the Court reveals an unsettling attitude of mistrust toward the
abilities, common sense, and motives of the lower federal courts. 76
D. Waiver of Immunity
In support of the narrow reading of section 307(f), the Court
cited McMahon v. United States77 for the proposition that waivers
of immunity must be "construed strictly in favor of the sover-
eign,"78 and Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States7 9 for the
rule that such waivers must not be enlarged "beyond what the
language requires."8o The Court stated that "care must be taken
not to 'enlarge' § 307(f)'s waiver of immunity beyond a fair read-
ing of what the language of the section requires." 81 The minority,
however, countered with two cases in which the Court appeared
to endorse careful, but non-restrictive, interpretation of statutes
authorizing suits against the government.82 This duel of conflict-
ing authorities did little to shed light on the issue in Ruckleshaus
v. Sierra Club.
The Court concluded that had Congress intended such a radical
section 304 suit, the defendants would have the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court; based on the instant decision, they would almost certainly prevail.
75. To date, there appear to have been no such cases. See, e.g., Delaware Citi-
zens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 62 F.R.D. 353, 355 (D. Del. 1974) (ac-
knowledging the power to award such fees but exercising discretion not to make
an award), affid, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975).
76. The Court's holding acts to limit the lower courts' use of discretion in one
situation only - where losing plaintiffs apply for an award of attorneys' fees. It
does not disturb their power to use discretion in awarding fees to successful de-
fendants where the court finds the plaintiff's lawsuit was "frivolous, unreasonable
or without foundation." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978). Nor does it affect their ability to use discretion in denying fees to success-
ful plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (4th
Cir. 1976) (although defendant insurance company operated a retirement fund in
violation of Civil Rights Act, attorneys' fees were not awarded to plaintiffs because
insurance company acted promptly to remedy the infraction); Carpenter v. An-
drus, 499 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Del. 1980) (successful plaintiff was not awarded
costs because his purpose was not to advance the statutory goals of the Endan-
gered Species Act). The courts are still required to use their discretion in discern-
ing whether parties are "partially prevailing" or "unsuccessful" under the Court's
newly articulated standard: "achieving some success, even if not major success."
103 S. Ct. at 3279 (emphasis in original).
77. 342 U.S. 25 (1951).
78. Id. at 27.
79. 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
80. Id. at 686.
81. 103 S. Ct. at 3277.
82. Id. at 3288 n.19.
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departure from established fee-shifting principles, it would have
so stated in far plainer language than that employed in section
307(f).83 An authorization of fees for unsuccessful parties "Would
require federal courts to make sensitive, difficult, and ultimately
highly subjective determinations."8 4 The Court's rejection of this
grant of discretion, in favor of a result reached by complicated
and somewhat suspect reasoning, promises to have a significant
impact on the future of environmental litigation in this country.8 5
V. IMPACT
The immediate impact of Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club will be felt
in all pending cases in which attorneys' fees have been sought
under section 307(f). Attorneys' fees might have been awarded in
such cases based on the holdings in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch and
similar cases. A denial of fees at this late stage in the game will
most likely have a serious adverse financial impact on those
plaintiffs who entered into litigation with some assurance that an
award of fees was available to them. 86
The future impact of the decision is more difficult to assess.
Cases such as Sierra Club v. Gorsuch had given environmental
groups some expectation that serious, innovative, and high-quali-
ty efforts to resolve both technical standards and matters of pub-
lic policy might receive compensation, even if the case was "lost"
on the merits.8 7 As a result of the instant decision, however, it is
unlikely that many new and complex cases will be undertaken by
environmentalist groups in the future.88 As the court in Sierra
83. Id. at 3281.
84. Id. But see supra note 76 (listing a wide range of situations requiring sen-
sitive, difficult, and ultimately subjective determinations). If the lower courts are
in the best position to exercise discretion in these cases, then they are probably
also the best judges of when a losing plaintiff has contributed to a case so substan-
tially as to be entitled to some compensation for his efforts.
85. This holding applies specifically to the environmental area, since the Court
states that its interpretation of "appropriate" in section 307(f) is binding on the
other statutes in which this language is used - which concern environmental liti-
gation. See supra note 6 (list of affected statutes).
86. As noted in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a new
policy of routine opposition to the grant of attorneys' fees to non-prevailing parties
was "abruptly" initiated, presumably due to the change of Administration in 1981.
87. The inherent difficulties involved in winning a case against the EPA are il-
lustrated in the standard used by the court in Sierra Club v. Costle: "[0]n close
questions [we have] given the agency the benefit of the doubt out of deference for
the terrible complexity of its job." 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
88. See Note, Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, supra note 4, at 686 (sug-
Club v. Gorsuch stated:
The questions raised by the Sierra Club and EDF needed to be resolved;
yet no other party had a sufficient economic interest at stake to represent
them .... [One cannot expect that contributions as substantial as those
made by Sierra Club and EDF would be made by public interest groups
without some form of compensation. 89
The cases that are undertaken may be only those which appear to
have a high potential for success, thus leaving difficult or uncer-
tain issues unresolved.90 Cases that are not iron-clad are less
likely to be undertaken in the future, because it now appears that
the courts are unwilling to liberally construe the term "some
success."
9 1
If the Court's holding results in a chilling effect on environmen-
tal litigation, what measures might be taken to alleviate the situa-
tion? If Congress did intend to allow attorneys' fees to be
awarded to non-prevailing parties at the discretion of the court, it
can still amend statutes utilizing the "appropriate" standard to
clarify its intent. It should be noted, however, that Congress fre-
quently couches statutory language in deliberately ambiguous
terms, preferring that the administrative agencies and the courts
take the blame for unpopular decisions.9 2 Also, Congress may be
reluctant to brave the political consequences of such reform, es-
pecially since the awarding of fees to unsuccessful litigants is
viewed by many as a radical departure from traditional values.
The current political make-up of Congress, its desire to be per-
ceived by the public as fiscally conservative, and almost certain
vigorous opposition by the current Administration make it un-
gesting that just as Alyeska Pipeline noticeably discouraged public interest litiga-
tion, so too will a rule against awarding fees to unsuccessful litigants).
89. 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club,
103 S. Ct. 2374 (1983).
90. "The major drawback of awarded fees is the possibility that they might en-
courage lawyers to ignore difficult and more complex cases in favor of those where
a fee could be obtained with little effort or risk." Note, Unsuccessful Environmen-
tal Litigants, supra note 4, at 687 n.58 (quoting CoUNcIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw,
BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAw IN AMERICA
315, 319 (1976)). If the award of fees might be a drawback, the possibility of no
fees at all may have even more of a deterrent effect.
91. The Court's dictum that "we do not mean to suggest that trivial success on
the merits, or purely procedural victories, would justify an award of fees," 103 S.
Ct. at 3279 n.9, only contributes more uncertainty. But see Hanrahan v. Hampton,
446 U.S. 754, 759 (1980) (success in procedural dispositions did not give rise to pre-
vailing plaintiff status even if party could affect ultimate determination on the
merits; actual victory on the merits of a claim is required). It is readily foresee-
able that varying interpretations of the Court's criteria will result in future law-
suits; thus, the Supreme Court may soon hear a similar case seeking clarification.
92. "When Congress is too divided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is no
doubt easier to pass [a] statute with some vague language." Wright, Beyond Dis-
cretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 584 (1972).
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likely there will be any such action in the near future.93
Nevertheless, the decision does not mean that the EPA has
been given carte blanche to take any action it desires, free from
any opposition. Additionally, public interest in environmental is-
sues seems to be at an all-time high. This interest may provide
environmental interest groups with both the financial and psycho-
logical support needed to continue in their "watch-dog" role.
One interesting possibility for change lies in a nonjudicial set-
tlement of environmental issues. The judicial process has become
a costly, time-consuming, and often unsatisfactory method of
resolving disputes over agency actions and standards because of
the technical complexities and scientific requirements involved in
environmental issues. As a result, courts often may not be the
most appropriate places in which to decide such disputes. 94
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club may prove to be the catalyst for the
establishment of a new, nonjudicial approach to settling environ-
mental disputes using such methods as mediation, negotiation,
and arbitration. Such an approach would be far less costly for all
concerned than the present method of litigating these issues in
court and would make the problems of fee-shifting less critical.
Congressional action would be required, but it would hopefully
create a new and improved method of implementing statutory
goals which could be more efficient than patching up former solu-
tions. Thus, although Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club was viewed by
environmental groups as a disaster, the case may usher in a new
era of increased cooperation among government, industry, and
environmentalists, replacing the current climate of adversarial
mistrust reflected in this decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in holding that nonprevailing parties are
not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under section 307(f)
and all other statutes with the same provision, took a restrictive
view of public interest litigation. It colored its approach with
preconceived notions of adversarial rights while ignoring Con-
93. See Note, Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, supra note 4, at 677 n.4
(describing pending proposals for amending more than seventy statutes to specifi-
cally restrict fee awards to substantially prevailing parties).
94. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, 338-39
(1981) (proposal for nonjudicial settlement of environmental issues by govern-
ment, industry, and environmentalists).
gress' stated support for litigation which provides a public benefit.
Courts have the prerogative, when faced with novel situations or
issues, to look to public policy as a guide in formulating decisions.
In this issue, the specific statement of public policy is clearly con-
tained in the record: "to encourage litigation which will assure
proper implementation and adminstration of the act or otherwise
serve the public interest."95 The Court's holding may lead to the
opposite result-a chilling effect on environmental litigation in
this country. Congress had given the courts of appeals the discre-
tion to decide what is "appropriate" in each case. The Supreme
Court, however, has superimposed its own discretion on the law,
thereby defeating the purposes for which the statute was
promulgated.
The Ruckleshaus decision will almost certainly hamper the ef-
forts of environmental groups, presenting as it does both practical
and psychological barriers to future challenges. It is uncertain
whether some of these barriers will be lifted by future congres-
sional action or if, spawned by a deepening conservative climate,
further restrictions will be enacted. The possibility of nonjudicial
settlement of environmental disputes-with a consequent reduc-
tion in fees incurred-appears to present a viable alternative, but
will require major restructuring of the present system. If this oc-
curs, the concerns of both the majority and minority in
Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club will have to be considered.
JEANNE A. TAYLOR
95. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 337, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1416.
